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The "Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs" was a speech delivered on November 25, 1969, by U.S. President Richard Nixon. In the speech, Nixon announced the end of the U.S. offensive biological weapons program and reaffirmed a no-first-use policy for chemical weapons. The statement excluded toxins, herbicides and riot-control agents as they were not chemical and biological weapons, though herbicides and toxins were both later banned. The decision to ban biological weapons was influenced by a number of domestic and international issues. ==Push for a U.S. ban== When Richard Nixon selected Melvin Laird as his Secretary of Defense in early 1969, Laird directed the Department of Defense to undertake a comprehensive review of U.S. biological warfare (BW) programs.〔Mangold, Tom. ''Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare''. Macmillan, 1999, pp. 54-57, (ISBN 0-312-20353-5).〕 Laird's push for a review of both the chemical and biological programs arose when Congress attempted to push the Pentagon for open, joint Congressional hearings on chemical-biological warfare (CBW).〔 The Pentagon balked and the result was Laird's memo to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger urging a review of those weapons programs.〔 Laird hoped to eliminate the U.S. BW program.〔 He saw two reasons to kill the BW program. The first was political—eliminating the program could deflect growing protests over Vietnam. The second was budgetary: As a U.S. Representative, Laird had watched Pentagon BW budgets balloon during the Kennedy and Johnson years.〔 With Laird's impetus, and the concurrence of the National Security Council staff, in late May 1969 Kissinger directed key administration officials to begin a review of CBW "policies, programs and operational concepts" with a report to be issued no later than September.〔 Surprisingly, Laird found the Joint Chiefs of Staff receptive to BW elimination as well. In twice weekly meetings with the Joint Chiefs during 1969 Laird found none of the officers opposed to ending the U.S. BW program.〔 They found the weapons ineffective and militarily useless, especially when compared to the U.S. nuclear arsenal.〔 The Joint Chiefs made two demands, one was to continue defensive germ warfare research and the other was that they be allowed to maintain the U.S. chemical arsenal as a deterrent to the Soviet Union.〔 In June 1969 Kissinger asked a former Harvard colleague, Matthew Meselson to prepare a position paper on U.S. chemical and biological weapons programs.〔〔 Meselson and Paul Doty then organized a private conference to discuss policy issues. The result was a September 1969 paper that not only urged U.S. ratification of the Geneva Protocol but an end to U.S. BW programs.〔 Meselson and his colleagues argued that a biological attack would likely inflict a great toll on civilian populations while remaining largely militarily ineffective.〔 Executive action on BW was followed by congressional action on chemical warfare (CW). In August 1969 the Senate passed an amendment to the Military Procurement Bill which unilaterally renounced first-use of chemical weapons.〔 The Senate action also issued a moratorium on the acquisition of new chemical weapons as well as de-emphasizing the need for CW readiness.〔 The bill passed 91-0, although some senators expressed reservations about the CW provisions.〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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